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THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
ATTORNEYS IN REGULATORY AGENCY
RULEMAKING
THOMAS O. MCGARITY*
I
INTRODUCTION
Every time a federal regulatory agency exercises its power to write rules to
govern private conduct, it must be prepared to resolve a wide variety of technical, economic, political, and legal issues. To assist them in these efforts, the
agencies have invented a variety of internal decisionmaking models to bring
different kinds of expertise to bear on regulatory problems. Legal expertise is
nearly always required at some stage of the internal decisionmaking process
because regulatory agencies are created by statute, agency powers are vested
and limited by statute, and virtually all agency rules are subject to judicial review for substantive rationality, procedural correctness, and fidelity to those
statutes and the Constitution. Agency lawyers from the Office of General
Counsel (sometimes called the Office of the Solicitor) therefore play important
roles in internal agency decisionmaking. Not surprisingly, the roles that agency
lawyers play in many ways mirror the roles that reviewing courts play in reviewing agency rules under the Constitution, agency statutes, and general stat1
utes like the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).
This essay will explore the many roles that agency lawyers can play in the
internal processes of developing proposed rules and responding to public comments on those rules. After briefly describing the two predominant models of
the internal decisionmaking process from the lawyer’s perspective, the essay
will examine how the agency lawyer functions within those models. In virtually
all rulemaking contexts, agency lawyers have the power to determine external
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1. 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 511-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344,
4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (1994)). This essay focuses exclusively on the role of lawyers in the office of an
agency that is assigned the role of providing general legal advice to the agency head or heads. In many
federal agencies, attorneys are employed by several offices that might need legal expertise of one form
or another. For example, the enforcement office typically employs attorneys to assist in enforcing the
agency’s regulations after they are written. To give the agency an understanding of how its rules will
play out in the real world where they have to be enforced, the enforcement office usually plays a role
in the original rulemaking exercise. That office, however, does not typically provide general legal advice about procedural correctness or the proper interpretation of the agency’s statute. The latter role
is ordinarily filled by a lawyer from the less specialized Office of General Counsel.
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procedures, to veto aspects of proposed rules that they find to be unlawful, and
to demand that the technical and economic staffs come up with more persuasive rationales for their resolution of controversial issues. In many rulemaking
contexts, lawyers also have the power to mold the substance of agency rules to
fit their own policy preferences or what they deem to be the policy preferences
of the reviewing judges. In the final analysis, however, agency lawyers are only
as influential as politically accountable upper-level decisionmakers allow them
to be, and this usually depends upon the degree to which upper-level decisionmakers trust the judgment of the particular lawyers with whom they deal on a
daily basis.
II
DECISIONMAKING MODELS
Federal regulatory agencies have invented many decisionmaking models for
bringing different sorts of expertise to bear on important issues that the agen2
cies must resolve as they promulgate rules. From the lawyer’s perspective,
however, only two models are relevant—the team model and the assembly line
model.
A. The Team Model
The team model is the predominant model for internal agency decision3
making in the context of informal rulemaking. In agencies employing this
model, the tasks of drafting the proposed rule, responding to public comments,
and coming up with a defensible rationale for the final rule are delegated to a
“team” or “work group” composed of representatives from all of the agency
subunits that have an interest in the outcome of the rulemaking process. Ordi2. In describing the role that regulatory analysis plays in federal agency rulemaking, I have suggested four distinct models for bringing economic expertise to bear on issues that arise in the rulemaking process: the team model, the hierarchical model, the adversarial model, and the outside adSee THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF
viser model.
REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (1991). The adversarial and outside adviser models, however, rarely describe the role that lawyers play in the internal rulemaking process.
Although agency lawyers frequently develop antagonistic relationships with other programs in an
agency, I know of no agency that has consciously designed the decisionmaking process to pit legal expertise against technical or economic expertise in the way that the National Highway Traffic Administration of the 1980s pitted its engineers in the Rulemaking Office against the economists in the Office
of Plans and Programs. See id. at ch. 15. I am also unaware of any agency that relegates its lawyers to
the very modest role of an outside adviser who is called upon only when legal expertise is deemed necessary. See id. at ch. 13. While it is entirely possible that some agencies relegate their lawyers to a
speak-when-spoken-to status in the rulemaking process, legal expertise is usually so important to
yielding a rule and accompanying analysis that will survive judicial review that lawyers in the Office of
the General Counsel are at the very least given veto power over issues involving procedural correctness and statutory interpretation. Thus, the team and the hierarchical models best describe the lawyer’s role in the rulemaking process. Instead of the term “hierarchical,” however, I employ the
“assembly line” metaphor in this essay to avoid the misleading impression that agency lawyers occupy
any particular position in an agency’s decisionmaking hierarchy.
3. For more a more detailed description of the team model, see id. at ch. 14; Thomas O.
McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57 (Autumn
1991).
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narily, a single “program office” within the agency bears the ultimate responsibility for the rule, and a representative from that office chairs the team. In addition to the chairperson, the team typically includes representatives from the
policy office (the office responsible for preparing regulatory impact assessments), the enforcement office, one of the agency’s regional or field offices,
and the Office of General Counsel.
The team meets regularly to discuss regulatory options, address newly arising issues, respond to informational demands of upper-level decisionmakers,
and resolve disputes among team members. Individual team members or small
subcommittees often take responsibility for particular tasks. Ordinarily, a
member of the team with expertise in a particular area is given the primary responsibility for addressing issues that arise in that area. Copies of memoranda,
rulemaking and regulatory analysis documents, and other decisionmaking
documents are circulated to team members for review and comment. All team
members are regarded as co-equal participants in the decisionmaking process,
and there is usually strong pressure, deriving from both the group psychology
of the effort and from upper-level decisionmakers, to reach consensus on important questions.
When consensus proves illusive, disputes are resolved in various ways. If a
member of the team feels strongly enough about the issue, he or she may elevate the dispute to higher levels within his or her office. If the higher-ups cannot resolve the matter, it can be left open in the team’s closure memorandum
for resolution by the agency head. However, team members can only elevate
disputes on a limited number of occasions or risk fracturing the overall consensus necessary for the effective operation of the team model.
B. The Assembly Line Model
Under the assembly line model, the program office takes complete responsibility for drafting the regulation and supporting documentation, including the
all-important Federal Register notices. The office may consult other offices
during the drafting process on issues for which it needs their expertise. For example, if it believes that resolution of a particular issue requires legal analysis,
the program office asks the Office of General Counsel to draft a memorandum
addressing that narrow question. Similarly, the program office may ask regulatory analysts in the policy office to prepare the relevant regulatory analyses; in
many large agencies, however, the program office employs its own analysts for
this task.
Once the program office has come up with a relatively complete draft of the
rule and supporting analysis, it circulates the package to other relevant offices
for “sign-off” prior to sending it to the agency head for consideration. If one of
the other offices has a problem with the program office’s work product, the internal decisionmaking process comes to a halt while the two offices attempt to
iron out their differences. While minor changes are usually accomplished
through memoranda and telephone calls, disagreements on major issues may
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result in a meeting of high-level officials from several offices. The power to
hold up the process pending “sign-off” provides leverage in cases in which the
program office is under pressure to produce a rule by a particular deadline. At
some point, however, the program office can take the matter directly to the
agency head for resolution.
III
ROLES FOR AGENCY LAWYERS
Agency lawyers play different roles in different agencies, and, even within
the same agency they may play different roles in different rulemaking contexts.
Within an agency, the lawyer’s role is determined to some degree by the politically appointed official or officials at the top of the agency. But the leadership’s desires are by no means the only determinant of the lawyer’s role. The
Office of General Counsel is a critical agency participant in the internal rulemaking process whose function outlasts the tenure of any single agency head.
More importantly, since nearly every rule of any consequence is subject to judicial review by aggrieved parties, the agency lawyer has an important function to
play in advising the relevant agency decisionmakers on the many aspects of the
rule that might be challenged in court. To an even greater degree than the desires of the agency leadership, the judicial decisions that set aside agency rules
for procedural incorrectness, erroneous interpretations of agency statutes, and
substantive irrationality determine the role that agency lawyers play in the
rulemaking process. The discussion below focuses on six prominent roles that
agency lawyers play in agency rulemaking.
A. Interpreter
The primary measure of the legitimacy of an agency’s exercise of rulemaking power is the statute under which the agency acts. As every administrative
lawyer knows, however, Congress does not always speak with precision when it
writes the statutes that empower the regulatory agencies. In virtually all agencies, the Office of General Counsel performs the role of statutory interpreter.
In the assembly line context, the program offices frequently request written
opinions from the agency’s legal office on critical questions of statutory interpretation that arise as the program office struggles to implement a new statute
or as novel questions arise under older statutes during the rulemaking process.
Rulemaking initiatives employing the team model involve one or more agency
lawyers from the outset to flag any important interpretational questions that
might not be immediately apparent to nonlawyers in the program office. Minor
legal questions are often resolved on an ad hoc basis at team meetings, but important or recurrent issues are typically addressed in formal legal memoranda
signed by the General Counsel or a senior agency lawyer.
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The Supreme Court’s landmark Chevron decision greatly enhanced the importance of the agency lawyer’s role as interpreter in the rulemaking process.
The Chevron Court held that, in cases of statutory ambiguity, courts must defer
in varying degrees to agency interpretations of the statutes that they adminis5
ter. Although the correctness and significance of the Chevron holding has
6
been much debated among administrative law scholars, its significance for
agency lawyers is clear. The interpretation that a junior agency lawyer places
on critical statutory language may be the final word on what that language
means, even though three or more highly credentialed judges are also asked to
opine on that meaning. When the Court speaks in grandiose constitutional
terms of proper judicial deference to the Executive Branch in the context of
agency rulemaking, it is really speaking of deference to the interpretational
ability of agency lawyers.
Ironically, continued judicial deference to agency interpretations under the
Chevron doctrine could ultimately reduce the power of agency lawyers in the
internal decisionmaking context. As officials in the program and policy offices
become convinced that reviewing courts will in fact defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory terms, the ability of the agency lawyer to predict
how the reviewing judges will interpret those terms becomes less vital. Frequent references in the Chevron opinion to agency technical expertise and deference to agency policymaking suggest that the program office’s experience or
the policy office’s policy preferences are just as important in determining the
7
meaning of statutory terms as the General Counsel’s legal expertise. In short,
4. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
5. In the words of the Chevron Court,
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
Id. at 842-43.
6. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1998); Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of
Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253 (1997); Michael L. Post, A “Hard Look”
at Chevron Step One: Statutory Construction of the Clean Air Act and Limitations on Agency Authority,
64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1223 (1996).
7. The Court in Chevron quoted approvingly from its prior opinion in Morton v. Ruiz for the
proposition that “[t]he power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created . . .
program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.” 467 U.S. at 843 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
The Court further stated that
the principle of deference to administrative interpretations has been consistently followed by
this Court whenever decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has involved reconciling
conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the given
situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected
to agency regulations.
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to the extent that the courts applying the Chevron analysis are in fact deferring
to agency expertise and policymaking, rather than to the interpretational skills
of agency lawyers, the power of agency lawyers to determine agency policy may
ultimately diminish. The frequency with which the reviewing courts find the
statutory meaning clear and consequently decline to move to the deferential
second stage of the Chevron analysis, however, suggests that agency lawyers
will continue to play a dominant role in resolving questions of statutory interpretation, if only to predict whether the reviewing court is likely to move past
8
stage one of the Chevron analysis.
B. Proceduralist
The United States Constitution demands that the government pay attention
to procedure when it takes action that affects the life, liberty, and property of
9
its citizens. In addition, Congress has prescribed procedures for agency rule10
making in the Administrative Procedure Act and, to a lesser degree, in indi11
vidual agency statutes. Regulatory agencies must therefore turn square procedural corners when they exercise their regulatory powers over private sector
entities. Agency lawyers are usually the institutional experts on procedure because their legal training makes them sensitive to process and because they are
the experts in interpreting statutory procedural directives. The lawyers therefore play a very large role in drafting the agency regulations establishing the
formal procedures that govern the agency and outside participants in various
regulatory contexts. Indeed, the Office of General Counsel is typically the lead
office in rulemaking initiatives involving agency procedures, and an agency
lawyer typically presides at any informal public hearings that the agency conducts in connection with rulemaking initiatives.
Agency lawyers also play a role in monitoring everyday regulatory activities
for procedural correctness. One might expect that this monitoring role would
be rather limited in the informal rulemaking context, because informal rulemaking was designed to reduce formal procedural barriers to agency action.
However, that relatively limited role has grown in recent years, as Congress,
the President, and the reviewing courts have added additional procedural and
analytical steps to the original informal rulemaking model.

Id. at 844.
8. Compare, e.g., MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994) (holding that the meaning of the phrase
“modify any requirement” is plain and no deference required); Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 (1994)
(refusing to give deference to Department of Veterans’ Affairs interpretation of statute that represented 60 years of administrative practice, to which Congress had not objected); with Nationsbank of
North Carolina, N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995) (holding that the Comptroller of the Currency’s interpretation of the phrase “the business of banking” in the National Bank
Act was entitled to deference under Chevron).
9. See U.S. CONST. amend V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
10. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553 (1994).
11. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (prescribing additional procedures for EPA rulemaking under
certain provisions of the Clean Air Act).
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The unadorned APA model for informal rulemaking begins with the
agency’s publication of a general notice setting forth the nature of the rulemaking proceedings, the legal authority under which the rule is promulgated,
and “either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the
subjects and issues discussed.” The courts have by-and-large read these minimal requirements flexibly, but agency rulemaking efforts have occasionally
been remanded (sometimes years after the rule has gone into effect) because
the agency’s notice of proposed rulemaking did not provide adequate notice of
12
some aspect of the final rule. Therefore, before promulgating a final rule, an
agency’s lawyers must be prepared to advise the agency whether the terms and
13
substance of the rule are a “logical outgrowth” of the original notice. When,
as frequently happens in lengthy rulemaking efforts, the agency adopts an option that was not clearly spelled out in the notice of proposed rulemaking, the
agency lawyer may have the unpleasant task of insisting that the agency issue a
second notice and consider additional comments.
Agency lawyers must also offer procedural advice concerning the content of
the administrative record upon which the agency must base its defense of the
rule on appeal. Agency lawyers must exercise a good deal of prescience in defining the record that the agency sends to the reviewing court to ensure that no
document is omitted that may be critical to a judicial assessment of the adequacy of the record under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review. For
rules that constitute “major federal action[s] significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment,” the record must also include an environmental
impact statement, and less significant actions must contain a “finding of no significant impact” and sufficient supporting documentation to sustain that finding
14
if challenged. In addition, recent amendments to the Regulatory Flexibility
15
Act require the agency to prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis for rules
having a significant impact upon a substantial number of small entities or to
16
explain why the rules will not have such an impact. Because this threshold determination, like the environmental impact determination, is now subject to judicial review, agency lawyers must monitor agency compliance with both of
these analytical requirements.
Because the agency lawyer’s proceduralist role may arise at any time after
the agency publishes its notice of proposed rulemaking, it often makes sense for
a lawyer to be involved throughout the process. One disadvantage of the assembly line model is that it generally allows the lawyer to perform this proceduralist role only after the procedural error has already been committed. At
this point, the agency’s options are limited to backtracking to the extent neces12. See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
13. See generally KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 7.3 (3d ed.
1994).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1994); 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2 (1997).
15. Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (1994 &
Supp. II 1996)).
16. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 603-604 (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
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sary to remedy the procedural error or attempting to gloss over or defend as
harmless the procedural error on judicial review. The team model reduces the
likelihood that the agency will have to go back to square zero for procedural
reasons, because the agency lawyer should be monitoring the procedures as
they evolve and suggesting ways to avoid judicial reversal on procedural
grounds.
C. Scrivener
Both the text of agency rules and the preambles to the proposed and final
versions of the rules are legal documents that will normally be scrutinized carefully by lawyers for the affected parties and by the judges of any reviewing
court. The agency must therefore take great care during the drafting process to
achieve clarity in the wording of the rule, to provide adequate references to the
record in support of the agency’s resolution of major issues, and to maintain a
consistent line of reasoning throughout. Lawyers are supposed to be
wordsmiths, and agency lawyers typically provide critical input in drafting the
text of agency rules, preambles, and even support documents.
Although agency lawyers are occasionally assigned the task of writing a portion of a rulemaking document (for example, the boilerplate language explaining the agency’s determination to decline to prepare an environmental impact
statement or regulatory impact assessment), the scrivener role more frequently
resembles that of an editor who helps clarify the meaning of existing text. The
lawyer can play this role equally well as the member of a team or as a reviewer
in the assembly line. Because few seasoned program office officials take any
pride of authorship in the text of a rule or preamble, the lawyer’s rather unglamorous scrivener role is generally uncontroversial and is usually greatly appreciated.
D. Rational Analyst
Agency lawyers would no doubt have to play their statutory interpretation,
proceduralist, and scrivener roles in the absence of the strong judicial reaction
to the rulemaking revolution of the 1970s. The evolution of the “hard look”
doctrine of judicial review in the mid-1970s, however, demanded that agency
lawyers perform the more controversial function of ensuring that the rule at
least appear to be rational to the minds of the three (and sometimes more)
lawyers who could be asked by disappointed participants to review the agency
rule for substantive rationality under the arbitrary-and-capricious test or, in
17
some odd statutory contexts, under the substantial evidence test.

17. See, e.g., RICHARD J. PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 7.5 (2d ed.
1992); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial
Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483 (1997); Thomas O. McGarity, The
Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525
(1997).
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Since regulatory agencies first began to rely heavily upon informal rulemaking in the early 1970s, agency lawyers have struggled with the task of ensuring that the rulemaking record and the agency’s accompanying explanations
adequately support the agency’s rulemaking exercise. In the early years,
agency lawyers lacked guidance from the courts as to what would be required
by way of documentation of agency factual determinations and rebuttal to
comments attacking agency interpretations, inferences, and factual conclusions.
As the courts began to remand rulemaking initiatives for additional documentation and explanation, agency lawyers could rely to some extent on the lan18
guage of the judicial opinions for guidance. That guidance, however, has
rarely been precise, and the actual conduct of the reviewing courts occasionally
left observers with the impression that whether a court would remand a rule
depended as much on the reviewing judge’s confidence in the substantive con19
tent of the rule as on any general principles of administrative law. The line
between setting aside an agency rule as an arbitrary and capricious exercise of
an agency’s rulemaking power, on the one hand, and remanding an agency rule
for a better explanation, on the other, is a fine one, and a court that is unconvinced of the soundness of an agency rule can usually find some defect in the
agency’s explanation that warrants remand for further clarification.
As the reviewing courts have aggressively insisted under the hard look doctrine that agencies explain themselves, agency lawyers have played a prominent
role in the process of drafting and compiling the agency’s contribution to the
rulemaking record. Just as a reviewing court may insist that the agency provide
more information and explanation, the conscientious agency lawyer may insist
that the program office come up with more data or a better explanation before
moving forward with a final rule. However, because the judicial guidelines on
the adequacy of the administrative record are vague, the line between sound
legal advice and policy advocacy is somewhat blurry. Just as a reviewing court
can steer an agency toward a particular substantive outcome by remanding for
further explanation, the agency lawyer can push the agency toward a substantive result by insisting upon more data or a better rationale for a determination
that the lawyer finds substantively disagreeable. This power to affect substantive agency output is not greatly affected by the decisionmaking model that the
agency uses. Whether in the team or the assembly line context, the lawyer’s
power to insist that the program office come up with better data, analysis, and
explanations in order to meet the requirements of hard look review can be used
to steer the agency in particular substantive directions.
18. The Supreme Court offered the best judicial guidance in the State Farm case when it stated
that a regulation is arbitrary and capricious if
the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed
to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that
runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983).
19. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301 (1988); McGarity, supra note 17, at 541-56.
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Seasoned EPA lawyer William F. Pedersen observed in one of the first
comprehensive examinations of the hard look doctrine that
it is a great tonic to a program to discover that even if a regulation can be slipped or
wrestled through various layers of internal or external review without significant
change, the final and most prestigious reviewing forum of all—a circuit court of appeals—will inquire into the minute details of methodology, data 20sufficiency and test
procedure and will send the regulations back if these are lacking.”

The same discovery also greatly enhanced the power of agency lawyers to affect
substantive outcomes in informal rulemaking.
E. Policy Partisan
Agency lawyers are professionals with an obligation to represent the interests of the agency, but they are also individuals with views about the role that
regulation should play in society. Many very highly qualified lawyers who
could be practicing in top-drawer law firms take low paying and low prestige
jobs in regulatory agencies not because they cannot take the stress of private
practice, but because they believe that the agency has an important mission,
and they want to advance the agency’s regulatory goals. Lawyers can attempt
to rein in their agencies or they can urge the agencies to exercise power to the
greatest extent consistent with their statutes. The lawyer can be a cautious
killjoy or a radical interventionist. Once aboard, agency lawyers have ample
opportunities to attempt to advance their policy preferences.
Although the cautious killjoy may more accurately describe the role that
lawyers typically play in the private corporate context, it is not necessarily the
most appropriate role for the agency lawyer. In the private context, companies
are generally free to pursue their economic ends within the constraints of the
law. The lawyer’s role is to advise against activities that violate the law; it is not
to encourage the company to choose any one of the available options that do
not violate the law. Lawyers acting as outside counsel are understandably especially reluctant to provide advice on how the officers of the client corporation should exercise their business judgment in pursuit of a business goal.
Agency lawyers occupy a somewhat different position in the scheme of
things. An agency lawyer has not been selected by the program office to advise
it on particular matters. The agency lawyer has been employed by the agency
as a public official with a responsibility both to the agency and the public at
large. The agency lawyer’s “client” is the agency as a whole, not a particular
office within the agency, and the Office of General Counsel is itself a part of
the agency. On legal questions that arise during the internal rulemaking process, agency lawyers normally have the final word until the reviewing courts say
otherwise. Not even the agency head, who may be a lawyer, is likely to secondguess the General Counsel on a question of law. Thus, agencies frequently
publish General Counsel opinions to provide guidance to the private sector
without circulating them for review or approval by other offices or the agency
20. William F. Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 60 (1975).
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head. On contentious policy questions that arise in rulemaking, however, the
agency lawyer need not defer to other offices unless told to do so by upperlevel decisionmakers. Agency lawyers may have views on how the agency
should exercise its policy judgment, and they are generally free to express those
views in team meetings or when rulemaking packages are circulated for their
review.
Unlike outside counsel in the corporate world, agency lawyers must address
at least two aspects of the statute that empowers the regulatory agency. Both
private sector and government lawyers must be concerned with the aspects of
regulatory statutes and the Constitution that limit the exercise of regulatory
power, but agency lawyers must also concern themselves with those aspects of
the regulatory statutes that demand that regulatory power be exercised to protect the beneficiaries of regulatory programs. Agency lawyers cannot ordinarily commit themselves to the cautious killjoy approach; the agency’s statute
may demand action. In some regulatory contexts (involving mandatory statutory language and deadlines), it may even be unlawful for the agency not to
21
act. In such cases, agency lawyers would be shirking their obligations to their
client agencies if they adopted an overly conservative posture. In the more
typical situation in which the statute does not clearly demand particular action,
there is still room for the agency lawyer to advise the agency to adopt a proactive stance to advance the agency’s overall statutory goals. In these contexts,
however, other offices within the agency may legitimately disagree with the
lawyers, and upper-level decisionmakers are free to accept or reject the lawyers’ policy advice.
When agency lawyers adopt the role of policy partisan, it is important that
they carefully distinguish between legal advice and policy advice. If the
agency’s statute demands that the agency take a particular action or adopt a
specific “policy lean” in resolving close questions, the lawyer should make that
clear and should caution agency officials that the agency risks reversal if it
takes a different action or adopts a different policy perspective. If, however,
the statute leaves the resolution of a particular question up to the agency’s discretion, the lawyer may urge agency officials to adopt a particular policy perspective, but he or she should clearly indicate that the agency is free to adopt a
different policy. Agency lawyers should, in other words, resist the temptation
to cloak their policy advice as legal advice. Otherwise, the lawyers are in a very
real sense usurping the constitutional power of Congress and politically accountable executive branch officials to make their own public policy.
Drawing the line between policy advice and legal advice is perhaps most
difficult when the lawyer is attempting to predict how a reviewing court will
view the agency’s resolution of complex technical questions under the arbitrary
and capricious or substantial evidence test. Lawyers know that reviewing
judges are sometimes guided by their own policy preferences when they engage
21. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Illinois v. Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. 340 (D.D.C. 1981).
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in this highly discretionary substantive review function. Thus, to some extent,
the lawyers’ legal advice becomes a matter of advising agency officials as to the
content of the reviewing judges’ policy preferences. Since agency lawyers cannot know who the reviewing judges will be until after the rule has been promulgated, advice of this sort is necessarily quite general and speculative in nature.
In this context, it is tempting for the agency lawyer to conclude that the reviewing court’s policy perspectives are more-or-less the same as the lawyer’s
policy preferences and advise agency officials accordingly. In contexts in which
this is clearly not the case (for example, where an activist agency lawyer provides advice with respect to a rule likely to be reviewed by conservative
judges), it is tempting for the lawyer to ignore the policy proclivities of the reviewing judges and thereby provide bad advice to agency officials. Both temptations should be resisted.
Because the team model allows the agency lawyer to provide policy input as
the rule evolves and because it values consensus so highly, it more easily facilitates the lawyer’s role as a policy partisan. The assembly line model allows the
agency lawyer to express policy views, but only after the program office has
made its presumptively determinative policy preferences known and only at the
risk of slowing down the entire rulemaking process to resolve an explicit policy
dispute. Thus, an agency that wants to minimize the lawyer’s policy partisan
role may be well advised to adopt the assembly line model.
F. Trusted Confidante
A high level agency lawyer who consistently provides sound legal and policy
advice can become a trusted confidante of the agency head, or the agency head
may appoint a trusted confidante to the position of General Counsel. In this
role, the lawyer is available for consultation on the whole universe of problems
that the agency head encounters, ranging from narrow questions of statutory
interpretation to interactions with the White House and Congress on sensitive
political questions. The trusted confidante role has an analog in the private
sector. In many companies, the General Counsel is a trusted confidante of the
Chief Executive Officer and provides advice on business matters ranging far
beyond strictly legal questions. Outside lawyers also occasionally play a trusted
22
confidante role.
Obviously, not every high level agency lawyer becomes a trusted confidante, and, in many agencies, no lawyer ever plays that role. However, when a
lawyer does assume that role, it is important that he or she attempt to distinguish policy (and political) advice from legal advice. Just as in the case of the
policy partisan role, a lawyer who is a trusted confidante must carefully distinguish between what must or may be done legally and what should be done from
a particular policy perspective.

22. See, e.g., WILLIAM GOULDEN, THE SUPERLAWYERS (1971); EVAN THOMAS, THE MAN TO
SEE (1991).
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The trusted confidante is a fairly dangerous role for the agency’s General
Counsel. The suspicion that the confidante is mixing policy with legal advice
may spur deep resentment among other high-level officials that do not share
the General Counsel’s insider status. Perhaps more importantly, the trusted
confidante may be so anxious to retain that exalted status that he or she feels
pressure to tell the agency head what the leader wants to hear, rather than provide neutral advice as to what the law allows or requires. An agency’s General
Counsel is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate to provide
sound legal advice to the agency as a whole. In cases where the trusted confidante cannot easily fulfill that obligation, it may be preferable for him or her to
seek reassignment to the agency head’s personal staff.
G. Advocate for the Agency
As previously discussed, the agency lawyer’s client is the agency as a whole,
not any particular office within the agency. When the agency finally resolves a
policy dispute, the agency lawyer must serve as an advocate for the agency in its
interactions with other agencies, the reviewing courts, and the general public.
Even though the lawyer strongly disagrees with the agency’s resolution of a
particular internal policy battle, he or she must diligently defend that resolution
in disputes with outsiders. Lawyers generally have a professional obligation to
use their skills to represent their clients, even when they strongly disagree with
23
those clients. John Adams certainly had no great love for the Redcoats that
he defended in the Boston Massacre trial, but he used his best efforts on their
behalf.
The role of agency advocate may be an especially difficult one for a lawyer
who has played a strong policy partisan role in the internal agency deliberations
and has lost the policy battle. When agency arguments are challenged in the
Office of Management and Budget, congressional committees, and the courts,
the agency lawyer must portray in the best light arguments with which he or she
may strongly disagree. Knowing full well the weaknesses of the agency’s position, the lawyer may not reveal those weaknesses to outsiders or in any way use
them against the agency. Only in the (one hopes) very rare cases in which that
agency proposes to commit a crime or attempts to deceive a court may the lawyer abandon his or her advocate role and take action that is contrary to the best
interests of the agency. Defending a decision with which the lawyer violently
disagrees may be exceedingly difficult, but it goes with the territory.
IV
CONCLUSION
In advising students about career choices, I frequently encounter idealistic
policy partisans who look to government employment as a way to avoid representing polluters and otherwise work to protect the environment. I normally
23. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 8 (1980).
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urge such students to consider employment with a federal environmental
agency as an exciting and rewarding way to practice law, but I also caution
them that employment as a government lawyer is very different from practice
with a private law firm or corporation.
First, when one works for a bureaucracy, one must continually deal with bureaucratic thinking and internal bureaucratic procedures. This means that the
lawyer must learn to think like a bureaucrat and, if he or she is to survive for
any length of time, must also learn to act like a bureaucrat. Like the other professionals in the agency, the lawyers must learn how to fight and win the internal turf wars that consume far too much of the attention of the agency’s staff.
Second, government lawyers must live with the reality of very limited resources and maximize the attendant benefits. On the one hand, the offices will
not be as large, the secretaries will not be as adept, the computers will not work
as well, and the pay will not be as high as in private law firms. On the other
hand, the fact of limited resources means that young government lawyers are
given far more responsibility than their counterparts in private law firms, and
they have a correspondingly greater opportunity to gain valuable professional
experience at an early stage of their careers.
Third, government lawyers get to play a wider variety of roles than most
private practitioners. The policy partisan’s role in particular is uncommon in
24
private practice. Government lawyers have a real opportunity to change the
world to fit their own views of how it should work. I always caution these students, however, that as agency lawyers, they will almost certainly be called
upon at one time or another to defend an agency position with which they
strongly disagree. However, this, too, is not unique to the government lawyer.
It is a rare lawyer indeed who has the luxury of representing only agreeable clients.

24. Lawyers who work for public interest groups play a strong policy advocate role, but those positions are in far shorter supply than positions with government agencies.

